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Of the many things the Constitution leaves us to puzzle out on our own, one of the most 
intriguing is the lack of a hierarchy for the different fundamental rights. In a conflict between 
equal protection and religious freedom, for example, which takes priority? The Framers left 
us no “order of preference” list, and there does not seem to be any objective basis upon which 
we can agree when one right prevails over another. So, what happens in such contests is a 
judicial weighing and balancing of constitutional rights, with outcomes depending upon the 
particular facts, the doctrinal test used, and the relevant societal norms. Brett Scharffs 
believes that this balancing has become skewed in recent years, in favor of equality and at the 
expense of religious freedom.1 In his thought-provoking article in this volume, he surveys 
several cases in the United States, Canada and Germany to support his argument that 
equality concerns are now regularly “trumping” religious freedom. I have a lot of sympathy 
for Professor Scharffs’s concern. Speaking as a member of the Muslim religious community, 
currently slammed in American public discourse on the grounds that sharia does not respect 
equality,2 I can readily believe that contemporary western societies are placing the principle 
of equality in a privileged position of judgment over religious exercise rather than seeking to 
find a balanced weighing of equality and religious freedom claims together. And I agree that 
this could be dangerous. A balance weighted in favor of equal protection over religious 
freedom seems plainly inappropriate in a constitutional scheme that does not create such a 
hierarchy of these rights.3 To make an intentional pun, religious freedom and equality are 
equally important, according to the Constitution, so it seems clear to me that we should not 
tolerate judicial favoritism of one over the other. 
Given my initial openness to Brett Scharffs’s premise, therefore, I was surprised that by 
the end of his article I found myself not completely convinced. In his presentation of several 
cases to show that equality is trumping religious freedom, I see evidence not of trumping, but 
rather of judicial balancing — perhaps imperfect, but not an obvious overriding of religious 
freedom by equality. His article leaves me with the sense that he might be on to something, 
but wondering if there are better cases out there to prove his point. And this is not the only 
way in which I think he underserves himself. There also seems to be some tantalizing but 
unrealized potential in Professor Scharffs’s insightful ideas about secularity (versus 
secularism) and pluralism, but he stops short of using them to make any specific proposal for 
improving the status quo. It seems to me that if he pushed these ideas to their fullest 
                                                                                                                               
 1. Professor Scharffs reduces this conflict to one between “freedom and equality.” Brett G. Scharffs, 
Equality in Sheep’s Clothing: The Implication of Anti-Discrimination Norms for Religious 
Autonomy, 10 Santa Clara J. Int’l L. 125 (2012). I find it to be a bit too much of a rhetorical 
abstraction, since freedom for one person can feel like oppression to another. For example, a gay 
rights claim for equal treatment could be reframed as a claim for freedom to make autonomous 
decisions about sexual activity, in which case a conflict with religious exercise would be a conflict 
between one kind of freedom and another, not between “freedom” and “equality” per se.  For this 
reason, I will use more specific terms than “freedom and equality” in this Comment. 
 2. The advocacy accompanying the “anti-sharia” legislation movement, to take just one example, 
centers on arguments that sharia discriminates against women, non-Muslims, and homosexuals. 
See, e.g., AMERICAN LAWS FOR AMERICAN COURTS, AMERICAN PUBLIC POLICY ALLIANCE (Oct. 11, 
2011), http://publicpolicyalliance.org/?page_id=195 (“Shariah law discriminates against women, 
homosexuals, non-Muslims, liberal or reforming Muslims”). 
 3. I realize that Professor Scharffs’s survey is not limited to the United States. I have framed my 
remarks in reference to the United States because this is the legal system I know best. 
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potential, he would uncover some powerful tools with which to creatively address the problem 
he presents. Although he does not do it here, I do hope his future work will expand on the 
implications of those very interesting ideas. 
I.  Trumping or Balancing? 
Before I explain why Professor Scharffs’s current paper has failed to convince me, let me 
first note where I agree with him. If it is in fact true that equality claims are, as he says, 
being “systematically preferenced”4 over religious freedom, I agree that this is a serious 
problem. While some may find nothing very objectionable about a regular disadvantaging of 
religious freedom when it comes into competition with the law of the land, I am not one of 
them. That is because I do not think the law of the land is always “better” than the practices 
of our religious communities. Sometimes the reverse might be true. What if, for example, the 
laws of the land protect slavery, and a religious institution refuses to hire slave owners? In 
that case, we can imagine that protection of religious freedom against the law of the land 
would be an eminently good thing, even potentially helping to evolve society for the better. On 
the other hand, religious practices are not always superior, either. And, because there is no 
non-subjective way to conclude which is which, there should be no presumed priorities. 
Careful judicial weighing of the competing rights and principles seems the only logical course. 
So if it is true that equality is systematically dominating every contest between it and 
religious freedom, I agree that this should be corrected. But Brett Scharffs’s presentation does 
not, to my mind, sufficiently make the case. For example, Ontario Human Rights Commission 
v. Christian Horizons5 is presented by Professor Scharffs as a “striking example of the 
triumph of equality over freedom.”6 In that case, he reports that the Canadian Supreme 
Court applied the “bona fide occupational qualification” (BFOQ) standard of the religious 
organization exemption to Ontario’s non-discrimination employment law to conclude that 
Christian Horizons’ employment restrictions based on sexual orientation did not qualify as a 
BFOQ for the job of support worker. Therefore, Christian Horizons was not entitled to the 
exemption and lost the discrimination suit brought by a former employee. The Court’s 
reasoning seems to me to be a reasonable balancing of the crucial principles at stake. As I 
understand it, Ontario has a law that prohibits discrimination for sexual orientation in 
employment. But Ontario recognizes that this presents a conflict for some religious practices, 
so it allows religious institutions to opt-out of the non-discrimination laws that otherwise 
would apply to them. But this opt-out is not absolute. It only exempts them if they can 
establish that the discrimination is sufficiently relevant to the job at issue. Christian 
Horizons was apparently not able to do this, so it was not entitled to the exemption. In the 
words of the Court, “[t]here is nothing in the nature of the employment itself which would 
make it a necessary qualification of the job that support workers be prohibited from engaging 
in a same sex relationship.”7 
                                                                                                                               
4. Scharffs, supra note 1. 
 5. Ont. Human Rights Comm’n v. Christian Horizons, 2010 ONSC 2105 (Can. 2010). 
 6. Scharffs, supra note 1. 
 7. Christian Horizons, 2010 ONSC at 64. 
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Brett Scharffs’s analysis of this case exaggerates the holding significantly. According to 
him, “[t]he Court says, in effect that there is nothing genuinely or sufficiently religious about 
a support worker’s work that would justify having religious qualifications for the job.”8 But 
that is not what the Court says. The Court is not declaring whether the job of support worker 
is “religious enough” to justify having any “religious qualifications.” Rather, it is deciding 
whether this specific religious qualification is sufficiently related to this specific job. Christian 
Horizons lost because they presented insufficient evidence to show why abstaining from a 
same-sex relationship is a necessary qualification to perform the stated job of cooking, 
cleaning, and dressing patients. The Court did not rule that the job of service worker is not 
religious enough to justify any religious qualification. Just not this one. 
Professor Scharffs, however, reads the holding to say that service work is not “religious 
enough” to justify the exemption. To prove that the Court is wrong, he quotes numerous 
biblical passages to show that support work is a quintessentially Christian thing to do. He 
concludes that the Court’s holding “is breathtaking . . . [in] its near perfect disregard for what 
Christians believe to lie at the heart of their religious vocation.”9 But the ruling is not about 
the religiosity (or non-religiosity) of the job, but rather, about the connection between the job 
qualification and the job. In other words, as I understand Ontario’s law, the state is willing to 
exempt religious organizations from its employment discrimination law for those situations 
where a job sufficiently requires the discriminatory employment rule. But it is not willing to 
give religious institutions a carte blanche to discriminate against any employee any time. 
Only those religious jobs for which the religious-based discrimination is relevant (determined 
by the BFOQ standard) will be exempt; others will not. This seems like a reasonable 
balancing of the freedom of religion to reject homosexuality against the secular right of 
individuals not to be discriminated in employment because of their sexual orientation. It 
reminds me of the judicial inquiry that accompanies every equal protection claim under the 
U.S. Constitution: the court examines both the government interest and the tailoring of the 
discriminatory rule to achieve the government interest. If the discriminatory practice is not 
sufficiently relevant to achieving the governmental purpose, then the discriminatory practice 
is struck down. Likewise here, the religiosity of the job is only partly relevant to the inquiry. 
The crucial question is really whether the discrimination against homosexuals is sufficiently 
connected to performing that job. 
The Court’s inquiries into the religiosity of the job of service worker (comparing it to more 
proselytizing jobs like minister, religious teacher and organist) seem to me to be attempts to 
find some connection between the need for the discrimination for the performance of this job. 
It is in completing this inquiry that the Court concludes: 
from an objective perspective, the support workers are not actively involved in converting the 
residents to, or instilling in them, a belief in Evangelical Christianity. There is nothing in the 
nature of the employment itself which would make it a necessary qualification of the job that 
support workers be prohibited from engaging in a same sex relationship.10 
                                                                                                                               
 8. Scharffs, supra note 1 at 145. 
 9. Id.  
10. Christian Horizons, 2010 ONSC at 64. 
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In other words, the connection would have been more clear to the Court if the job were of a 
proselytizing nature, but without more evidence, it does not see why Christian Horizons must 
hire only those not in a same-sex relationship for the support worker job. 
I suspect the Christian Horizons lawyers might have failed their clients here. I can 
imagine quite a lot of additional facts they could have presented that might have helped the 
Court see that abstention from same-sex relationships was a BFOQ for the job in question. In 
doing so, they could also have emphasized that the job in question is not just the job of a 
service worker per se, but rather, the job of a service worker in this particular Christian home 
environment where it is likely that employees are expected to be role models of Christian 
behavior to all of the residents. I can imagine that a woman in a same-sex relationship might 
do things that would compromise that “role model” expectation — perhaps kissing her 
partner on the way to or from work, casually talking about her partner in conversations with 
others about their families, and so forth. If something along the lines of a “Christian role 
model” were expected of all Christian Horizons employees, I can see a direct connection 
between this discriminatory rule and this job. Therefore, I think it is quite possible that this 
case was decided wrongly, but not because, as Professor Scharffs argues, the Court “[took] 
sides about what kind of work is sufficiently religious to warrant protection.”11 Rather, the 
problem seems to be that the lawyers and the Court oversimplified the job qualification 
question. The question was not whether a homosexual could do the job of service worker, but 
the much more specific one of whether an openly gay woman could do the job of service 
worker in this particular Christian environment? I think there is potentially a fairly good 
case to be made that the answer is no. But no one seems to have made it.12 As in most 
constitutional balancing cases, sometimes everything rides on how you ask the question. 
Brett Scharffs also seems to be stuck on the wrong question. He warns that we should all 
get nervous when “courts start declaring what is and is not ‘objectively’ religious.”13 Fair 
enough. But he seems so distracted by the Court’s inquiries into the religious nature of 
service work that he misses the importance of the connection between the (religious) job and 
the discriminatory rule. This connection is important because it is the way that the state has 
                                                                                                                               
11. Scharffs, supra note 1, at 145.  
 12. Brett Scharffs seems to be aware of the importance of role modeling (“Schools are not alone in being 
institutions where teaching takes place; homes, too, are a place where beliefs are not only taught, 
but also modeled.” Id. at 140), and he complains that “the Court does not even consider whether the 
belief and conduct requirements that all Christian Horizons employees agree to abide are 
reasonably related to creating and maintaining this Evangelical Christian environment.” Id. at 140. 
Nevertheless, he doesn’t specify exactly how the role modeling piece of the puzzle, along with a more 
careful specification of the job qualification might have pushed the Court to pay more attention to 
exactly these factors. Instead, he slips into the same oversimplification problem. He says, 
“[A]ccording to the Ontario Court, while endeavoring to convert others to Evangelical Christianity, 
or teaching and promoting a belief in Evangelical Christianity, would create an objective basis for 
religious qualifications, being a ‘support worker’ is not objectively sufficiently religious in nature to 
justify religious qualifications.” Id. at 136. As I have stated above, this is not the question the Court 
is answering. I would rewrite Professor Scharffs’s sentence thus: “[A]ccording to the Ontario Court, 
while endeavoring to convert others to Evangelical Christianity, or teaching and promoting a belief 
in Evangelical Christianity, would create an objective basis for religious qualifications, being a 
“support worker” is not the type of job in nature to justify a requirement not to be in a same-sex 
relationship.” 
 13. Id. at 137.  
10  SANTA CLARA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW  139 (2012) 
144 
chosen to balance the competition between two important rights — religious freedom and 
non-discrimination. Again, in this balancing, only certain types of religious employment 
discrimination are tolerated — those where the job is sufficiently related to the 
discriminatory rule. This balancing of rights makes the BFOQ the crucial legal question, not 
whether or not the job in question is religious. A different balancing could have chosen to 
allow no exemptions, not even for the most “religious” of jobs. For example, a church cannot 
use a slave to be its minister. The job of ministry is obviously religious. But that is not the 
only relevant issue. The religious freedom of a church to select its own ministers is balanced 
(and will lose) against the supreme fundamental law that prohibits slavery. That same 
religious freedom to select ministers is balanced (and will likely win) against state non-
discrimination laws on sexual orientation. Those are the rights-balancing choices our public 
policies have made. And in this balance, it is never just the religiosity of the job that is the 
crucial question. It is whether in this case, this equality violation is of the type that the state’s 
balancing between equality and religious freedom can tolerate. 
But where I see a balancing (imperfect though it may be), Brett Scharffs sees a “pattern of 
equality trumping liberty.”14 That is not to say that I don’t necessarily believe it is happening, 
it just means that I don’t see conclusive evidence for it in this paper. I wonder whether a 
wider swath of material might tell a more persuasive story. It strikes me that the problem 
with enforcing equality for equality’s sake has been a compelling question outside of the 
“religious freedom vs. equality” conflict. Equal protection jurisprudence itself has wrestled 
with this question, as the anti-classification view of Justices Thomas and Scalia has gained 
more majorities than the anti-subordination view of Justices Brennan and Marshall. The 
strict scrutiny treatment of affirmative action race classifications, despite the qualitative 
differences with the racially-classified schools of the 1950s, is still a point of social and 
jurisprudential debate in our society. I am sure there are other fields from which Professor 
Scharffs could draw to detail a fuller picture of the scope of equality “trumping” other 
fundamental principles and whether it is in fact happening in a dangerous way. Without 
more egregious and pervasive examples, I found his conclusions that equality is 
systematically trampling religious freedom ultimately unconvincing. 
Because I am not convinced that equality is trumping religious freedom, I am frustrated 
by his conclusion. He ends his article with several statements that equality should not be 
taken to be an absolute value, and that it should be balanced against other values, like 
religious freedom.  For example, he says that “we must find ways of accommodating, 
integrating, harmonizing, and hopefully vindicating the values of both freedom and equality[, 
because] equality alone is not sufficient as a political or moral ideal.”15 But, of course, no one 
really says it is. It may be very important, but I think we all agree that it should be balanced 
against other fundamental values. And, to my mind, it looks like that is what has been 
happening — even in the cases on which Professor Scharffs focuses his paper. Moreover, he 
does not give us any detailed idea of what the proper judicial analysis would look like under 
an ideal balancing. So, if the reader is not convinced that equality is taking over equality 
                                                                                                                               
14.  Id. at 147.  
 15. Id. at 160.  
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religious freedom, his call for balancing sounds like a redundant call for the courts to do what 
they are already doing. 
There is one other aspect of Professor Scharffs’s paper that frustrates me: I want more 
from his secularity insights. That is, I wish that he would more aggressively apply his ideas 
about secularity and pluralism to this topic. Brett Scharffs is already known in the field for 
arguing that “the state should strive to create a framework of secularity, characterized by 
neutrality and pluralism, rather than a system of secularism, characterized by a secular 
ideology that requires conformity and uniformity in accordance with perceived secular 
values.”16 Professor Scharffs believes that there is something lost when secularism insists on 
the “monochromatic” imposition of conformity and uniformity, and that he is opposed to a 
“robust secularism muscling out difference.”17 These are exciting words. His argument 
resonates strongly with me, because my own current work focuses on the inherent legal 
pluralism of sharia and what this should mean for modern Islamic constitutionalism. 
Moreover, I am among those who have long been frustrated with the negative effect that 
“monochromatic” colonial nation-states have had upon the legal and political systems of 
Muslim majority countries — places where, in pre-colonial times, legal and political authority 
was arranged so as to recognize and facilitate a multiplicity of Islamic legal schools, as well as 
those of other religious communities. I believe the monochromatic imposition of secularism in 
these countries made things worse, not better, in the long run.18 
Because Professor Scharffs sees his presentation of equality trumping religious freedom as 
an illustration of the problem of “robust secularism muscling out difference,” and because he 
insists that a “liberal democracy need not — ought not — demand conformity of its citizens,”19 
I am curious about how creative he is willing to be to resolve the equality-freedom conflict 
that he presents here. We know that Professor Scharffs wants a balancing of equality with 
religious freedom, rather than (what he sees as) a consistent preference for equality. But 
what if he is unable to convince the relevant powers to change? What if our courts and 
legislatures ultimately disagree that there is any inappropriate trumping of religious freedom 
by equality, and the law continues to evolve in the direction that it is now. What then? Is 
there another way to address the neglected needs of these religious communities? 
I wonder if some answers are hidden inside Professor Scharffs’s insights about secularity 
and pluralism. I see some powerful potential in the fact that he cites John Locke for the idea 
that “respecting religious differences and creating a safe space for religious minorities would 
generate gratitude and loyalty towards the state.”20 Moreover, he asserts that “a liberal 
democracy should carve out safe space where people can live out their lives and commitments 
within broad parameters without undue interference or oversight by the state.”21 So, my 
                                                                                                                               
 16. Id. at 161.  
17.  Id. at 162.  
 18. The details of this point are too complicated to explain here. For a brief summary, see Asifa 
Quraishi, The Separation of Powers in the Tradition of Muslim Governments, in 
CONSTITUTIONALISM IN ISLAMIC COUNTRIES: BETWEEN UPHEAVAL AND CONTINUITY (Tilmann Roder 
& Rainer Grote eds., 2011). 
 19. Scharffs, supra note 1, at 160.  
 20. Id. at 164.  
 21. Id. at 161-62. 
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question to Professor Scharffs is, “How seriously do you mean that?” If the state continues to 
trump religious freedom with equality, is there another way to “carve out a safe space” for 
religious freedom? If taken to its most logical conclusions, does that mean that a “carving out” 
of legal realms would be the best protector of the freedoms implicated? That is to say, if one is 
serious about legal pluralism, then the most important work is not about finding an 
appropriate doctrinal legal balancing, but rather about effectively creating opt-out parallel 
legal realms. The Beth Din Jewish arbitration tribunals currently serving American orthodox 
Jewish communities seeking to have their legal disputes decided primarily by Jewish 
halakha is one example. Native American tribal autonomy over many indigenous people’s 
conflicts is another. So, do Professor Scharffs’s ideas about the religious pluralism created by 
secularity mean that he would be interested in the benefits of a “carving out” of legal realms 
for Christian religious institutions to adjudicate their own legal issues according to their own 
laws? Could such an arrangement operate as a sort of “religious legal federalism” where the 
“safe space” created for spiritually-based communities could ultimately lead to “laboratories of 
experimentation” that generated a wider variety of ideas about the social good?22 And would 
this scheme better protect religious freedom? Or would it encounter the same equality 
balancing controls that presently face religious freedom claims? 
These are all very live questions that are being asked right now about the phenomenon of 
Muslims living by sharia in the secular west.23 And Brett Scharffs’s emphasis on religious 
freedom and pluralism and the problems of monochromatic secularism seem to create a clear 
opportunity for him to take part in a much larger American conversation about religious 
freedom, pluralism, religious minorities, and legal autonomy. I had the good fortune of being 
able to ask him in person whether his ideas about secularity and pluralism, and his 
comments in this article about the power of institutional autonomy and jurisdiction, should 
be taken as implying anything about these “religious legal federalism” questions. He 
answered in the negative: he would not go quite that far. His present article, therefore, should 
be read simply as a doctrinal critique of existing laws and their application. But, in my 
opinion, this article touches on a small part of a very large topic of great relevance to many. I 
would not be surprised — and pleased — to find myself again sharing a podium with him 
sometime in the near future, where the larger questions about religious freedom and legal 
pluralism are placed in front of both of us. And I expect I will again learn much from our 
exchange. 
                                                                                                                               
 22. For example, could a powerful realm of kosher and halal regulation generate valuable information 
about humane treatment of animals? Could Muslim regulations against wildly speculative business 
ventures offer some useful ideas about the causes of our global economic problems? Could Native 
American norms create new ideas for environmentalism? 
 23. For an example of the argument that this is a threat to American rule of law, see SHARIAH LAW AND 
AMERICAN STATE COURTS: AN ASSESSMENT OF STATE APPELLATE COURT CASES (Center for Security 
Policy 2011), http://shariahinamericancourts.com/ (last visited April 10, 2012). 
